Saturday, October 11, 2014

The Sordid Contra-Cocaine Saga: "Just doing the Boss Man's bidding"

CIA corruption? We need to question our use of the term,
"corruption". We might question whether the CIA does its job
efficiently. Or we might wonder if they are harboring poorly trained
bunglers. But the fact remains that the CIA is doing the bidding of
the American Corporate Empire(ACE.
Does anyone really believe that a powerful ruling class would tolerate
an agency that appears to bungle its assignments and work against the
"Peoples" interest?
If we take the position that the CIA is doing its job, as is the FBI,
the NSA and the Pentagon, the picture is much clearer regarding just
who the real American People are. Believe me, these agencies are
doing a cracker jack job of defending and promoting their bosses
interests. Just because their actions deeply offend and even frighten
me, that is no sign that they are corrupt. True, they are anti
Working/Lower Class, but they are not corrupt.
People like Gary Webb learned the hard truth regarding just how
efficient and ruthless these "defenders of freedom" can be. Through
such highly trained agencies, the Ruling Class controls our destiny.
They own the mass media and slap down anyone, like Gary Webb, who dare
to take their agencies to task.
Do we really believe that the Master's Stoolies can serve our needs as
well as those of their Corporate Bosses? Can Man serve God and Satan
at the same time?

Carl Jarvis




On 10/10/14, Miriam Vieni <miriamvieni@optonline.net> wrote:
> Very long, detailed article, but among other things, it shows the longterm
> corruption of the CIA and of the mass media.
>
>
> Parry writes: "The movie, 'Kill the Messenger,' is forcing the mainstream
> U.S. media to confront one of its most shameful episodes, the suppression
> of
> a major national security scandal implicating Ronald Reagan's CIA."
>
> Former U.S. president Ronald Reagan. (photo: unknown)
>
>
> The Sordid Contra-Cocaine Saga
> By Robert Parry, Consortium News
> 10 October 14
>
> The movie, "Kill the Messenger," is forcing the mainstream U.S. media to
> confront one of its most shameful episodes, the suppression of a major
> national security scandal implicating Ronald Reagan's CIA in aiding and
> abetting cocaine trafficking by the Nicaraguan Contra rebels in the 1980s
> and then the systematic destruction of journalist Gary Webb when he revived
> the scandal in the 1990s.
> Hollywood's treatment of this sordid affair will likely draw another
> defensive or dismissive response from some of the big news outlets that
> still don't want to face up to their disgraceful behavior. The New York
> Times and other major newspapers mocked the Contra-cocaine scandal when
> Brian Barger and I first exposed it in 1985 for the Associated Press and
> then savaged Webb in 1996 when he traced some of the Contra-cocaine into
> the
> manufacture of crack which ravaged American cities.
> So, when you're watching this movie or responding to questions from friends
> about whether they should believe its storyline, you might want to know
> what
> is or is not fact. What is remarkable about this tale is that so much of it
> now has been established by official government documents. In other words,
> you don't have to believe me and my dozens of sources; you can turn to the
> admissions by the Central Intelligence Agency's inspector general or to
> evidence in the National Archives.
> For instance, last year at the National Archives annex in College Park,
> Maryland, I discovered a "secret" U.S. law enforcement report that detailed
> how top Contra leader Adolfo Calero was casually associating with Norwin
> Meneses, described as "a well-reputed drug dealer."
> Meneses was near the center of Webb's 1996 articles for the San Jose
> Mercury-News, a series that came under fierce attack from U.S. government
> officials as well as major news organizations, including the New York
> Times,
> the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. The controversy cost Webb
> his
> career, left him nearly penniless and ultimately drove him to suicide on
> Dec. 9, 2004.
> But the bitter irony of Webb's demise, which is the subject of "Kill the
> Messenger" starring Jeremy Renner as Webb, is that Webb's much-maligned
> "Dark Alliance" series eventually forced major admissions from the CIA, the
> Justice Department and other government agencies revealing an even-deeper
> relationship between President Reagan's beloved Contras and drug cartels
> than Webb (or Barger and I) ever alleged.
> Typical of the evidence that the Reagan administration chose to ignore was
> the document that I found at the National Archives, recounting information
> from Dennis Ainsworth, a blue-blood Republican from San Francisco who
> volunteered to help the Contra cause in 1984-85. That put him in position
> to
> witness the strange behind-the-scenes activities of Contra leaders
> hobnobbing with drug traffickers and negotiating arms deals with White
> House
> emissaries.
> Ainsworth also was a source of mine in fall 1985 when I was investigating
> the mysterious sources of funding for the Contras after Congress shut off
> CIA support in 1984 amid widespread reports of Contra atrocities inflicted
> on Nicaraguan civilians, including rapes, executions and torture.
> Ainsworth's first-hand knowledge of the Contra dealings dovetailed with
> information that I already had, such as the central role of National
> Security Council aide Oliver North in aiding the Contras and his use of
> "courier" Rob Owen as an off-the-books White House intermediary to the
> Contras. I later developed confirmation of some other details that
> Ainsworth
> described, such as his overhearing Owen and Calero working together on an
> arms deal as Ainsworth drove them through the streets of San Francisco.
> As for Ainsworth's knowledge about the Contra-cocaine connection, he said
> he
> sponsored a June 1984 cocktail party at which Calero spoke to about 60
> people. Meneses, a notorious drug kingpin in the Nicaraguan community,
> showed up uninvited and clearly had a personal relationship with Calero,
> who
> was then the political leader of the Contra's chief fighting force, the
> CIA-backed Nicaraguan Democratic Force (or FDN).
> "At the end of the cocktail party, Meneses and Calero went off together,"
> Ainsworth told U.S. Attorney Joseph P. Russoniello, according to a "secret"
> Jan. 6, 1987 cable submitted by Russoniello to an FBI investigation
> code-named "Front Door," a probe into the Reagan administration's
> corruption.
> After Calero's speech, Ainsworth said Meneses accompanied Calero and about
> 20 people to dinner and picked up the entire tab, according to a more
> detailed debriefing of Ainsworth by the FBI. Concerned about this
> relationship, Ainsworth said he was told by Renato Pena, an FDN leader in
> the San Francisco area, that "the FDN is involved in drug smuggling with
> the
> aid of Norwin Meneses who also buys arms for Enrique Bermudez, a leader of
> the FDN." Bermudez was then the top Contra military commander.
> Corroborating Account
> Pena, who himself was convicted on federal drug charges in 1984, gave a
> similar account to the Drug Enforcement Administration. According to a 1998
> report by the Justice Department's Inspector General Michael Bromwich,
> "When
> debriefed by the DEA in the early 1980s, Pena said that the CIA was
> allowing
> the Contras to fly drugs into the United States, sell them, and keep the
> proceeds. ...
> "Pena stated that he was present on many occasions when Meneses telephoned
> Bermudez in Honduras. Meneses told Pena of Bermudez's requests for such
> things as gun silencers (which Pena said Meneses obtained in Los Angeles),
> cross bows, and other military equipment for the Contras. Pena believed
> that
> Meneses would sometimes transport certain of these items himself to Central
> America, and other times would have contacts in Los Angeles and Miami send
> cargo to Honduras, where the authorities were cooperating with the Contras.
> Pena believed Meneses had contact with Bermudez from about 1981 or 1982
> through the mid-1980s."
> Bromwich's report then added, "Pena said he was one of the couriers Meneses
> used to deliver drug money to a Colombian known as 'Carlos' in Los Angeles
> and return to San Francisco with cocaine. Pena made six to eight trips,
> with
> anywhere from $600,000 to nearly $1 million, and brought back six to eight
> kilos of cocaine each time. Pena said Meneses was moving hundreds of kilos
> a
> week. 'Carlos' once told Pena, 'We're helping your cause with this drug
> thing ... we are helping your organization a lot."
> Ainsworth also said he tried to alert Oliver North in 1985 about the
> troubling connections between the Contra movement and cocaine traffickers
> but that North turned a deaf ear. "In the spring some friends of mine and I
> went back to the White House staff but we were put off by Ollie North and
> others on the staff who really don't want to know all what's going on,"
> Ainsworth told Russoniello.
> When I first spoke with Ainsworth in September 1985 at a coffee shop in San
> Francisco, he asked for confidentiality which I granted. However, since the
> documents released by the National Archives include him describing his
> conversations with me, that confidentiality no longer applies. Ainsworth
> also spoke with Webb for his 1996 San Jose Mercury-News series under the
> pseudonym "David Morrison."
> Though I found Ainsworth to be generally reliable, some of his depictions
> of
> our conversations contained mild exaggerations or confusion over details,
> such as his claim that I called him from Costa Rica in January 1986 and
> told
> him that the Contra-cocaine story that I had been working on with my AP
> colleague Brian Barger "never hit the papers because it was suppressed by
> the Associated Press due to political pressure primarily from the CIA."
> In reality, Barger and I returned from Costa Rica in fall 1985, wrote our
> story about the Contras' involvement in cocaine smuggling, and pushed it
> onto the AP wire in December though in a reduced form because of resistance
> from some senior AP news executives who were supportive of President
> Reagan's foreign policies. The CIA, the White House and other agencies of
> the Reagan administration did seek to discredit our story, but they did not
> prevent its publication.
> An Overriding Hostility
> The Reagan administration's neglect of Ainsworth's insights reflected the
> overriding hostility toward any information - even from a Republican
> activist like Ainsworth - that put the Contras in a negative light. In
> early
> 1987, when Ainsworth spoke with U.S. Attorney Russoniello and the FBI, the
> Reagan administration was in full damage-control mode, trying to tamp down
> the Iran-Contra disclosures about Oliver North diverting profits from
> secret
> arms sales to Iran to the Contra war.
> Fears that the Iran-Contra scandal could lead to Reagan's impeachment made
> it even less likely that the Justice Department would pursue an
> investigation into drug ties implicating the Contra leadership. Ainsworth's
> information was simply passed on to Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh
> whose
> inquiry was already overwhelmed by the task of sorting out the convoluted
> Iran transactions.
> Publicly, the Reagan team continued dumping on the Contra-cocaine
> allegations and playing the find-any-possible-reason-to-reject-a-witness
> game. The major news media went along, leading to much mainstream ridicule
> of a 1989 investigative report by Sen. John Kerry, D-Massachusetts, who
> uncovered more drug connections implicating the Contras and the Reagan
> administration.
> Only occasionally, such as when the George H.W. Bush administration needed
> witnesses to convict Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega did the
> Contra-cocaine evidence pop onto Official Washington's radar.
> During Noriega's drug-trafficking trial in 1991, U.S. prosecutors called as
> a witness Colombian Medellín cartel kingpin Carlos Lehder, who -- along with
> implicating Noriega -- testified that the cartel had given $10 million to
> the
> Contras, an allegation first unearthed by Sen. Kerry. "The Kerry hearings
> didn't get the attention they deserved at the time," a Washington Post
> editorial on Nov. 27, 1991, acknowledged. "The Noriega trial brings this
> sordid aspect of the Nicaraguan engagement to fresh public attention."
> But the Post offered its readers no explanation for why Kerry's hearings
> had
> been largely ignored, with the Post itself a leading culprit in this
> journalistic misfeasance. Nor did the Post and the other leading newspapers
> use the opening created by the Noriega trial to do anything to rectify
> their
> past neglect.
> Everything quickly returned to the status quo in which the desired
> perception of the noble Contras trumped the clear reality of their criminal
> activities. Instead of recognizing the skewed moral compass of the Reagan
> administration, Congress was soon falling over itself to attach Reagan's
> name to as many public buildings and facilities as possible, including
> Washington's National Airport.
> Meanwhile, those of us in journalism who had exposed the national security
> crimes of the 1980s saw our careers mostly sink or go sideways. We were
> regarded as "pariahs" in our profession.
> As for me, shortly after the Iran-Contra scandal broke wide open in fall
> 1986, I accepted a job at Newsweek, one of the many mainstream news outlets
> that had long ignored Contra-connected scandals and briefly thought it
> needed to bolster its coverage. But I soon discovered that senior editors
> remained hostile toward the Iran-Contra story and related spinoff scandals,
> including the Contra-cocaine mess.
> After losing battle after battle with my Newsweek editors, I departed the
> magazine in June 1990 to write a book (called Fooling America) about the
> decline of the Washington press corps and the parallel rise of a new
> generation of government propagandists.
> I was also hired by PBS Frontline to investigate whether there had been a
> prequel to the Iran-Contra scandal -- whether those arms-for-hostage deals
> in
> the mid-1980s had been preceded by contacts between Reagan's 1980 campaign
> staff and Iran, which was then holding 52 Americans hostage and essentially
> destroying Jimmy Carter's reelection hopes. [For more on that topic, see
> Robert Parry's Secrecy & Privilege and America's Stolen Narrative.]
> Finding New Ways
> In 1995, frustrated by the growing triviality of American journalism -- and
> acting on the advice of and with the assistance of my oldest son Sam -- I
> turned to a new medium and launched the Internet's first investigative news
> magazine, known as Consortiumnews.com. The Web site became a way for me to
> put out well-reported stories that my former mainstream colleagues ignored
> or mocked.
> So, when Gary Webb called me in 1996 to talk about the Contra-cocaine
> story,
> I explained some of this tortured history and urged him to make sure that
> his editors were firmly behind him. He sounded perplexed at my advice and
> assured me that he had the solid support of his editors.
> When Webb's "Dark Alliance" series finally appeared in late August 1996, it
> initially drew little attention. The major national news outlets applied
> their usual studied indifference to a topic that they had already judged
> unworthy of serious attention.
> But Webb's story proved hard to ignore. First, unlike the work that Barger
> and I did for AP in the mid-1980s, Webb's series wasn't just a story about
> drug traffickers in Central America and their protectors in Washington. It
> was about the on-the-ground consequences, inside the United States, of that
> drug trafficking, how the lives of Americans were blighted and destroyed as
> the collateral damage of a U.S. foreign policy initiative.
> In other words, there were real-life American victims, and they were
> concentrated in African-American communities. That meant the ever-sensitive
> issue of race had been injected into the controversy. Anger from black
> communities spread quickly to the Congressional Black Caucus, which started
> demanding answers.
> Secondly, the San Jose Mercury-News, which was the local newspaper for
> Silicon Valley, had posted documents and audio on its state-of-the-art
> Internet site. That way, readers could examine much of the documentary
> support for the series.
> It also meant that the traditional "gatekeeper" role of the major
> newspapers
> -- the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times -- was
> under assault. If a regional paper like the Mercury-News could finance a
> major journalistic investigation like this one, and circumvent the
> judgments
> of the editorial boards at the Big Three, then there might be a tectonic
> shift in the power relations of the U.S. news media. There could be a
> breakdown of the established order.
> This combination of factors led to the next phase of the Contra-cocaine
> battle: the "get-Gary-Webb" counterattack. Soon, the Washington Post, the
> New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times were lining up like some tag-team
> wrestlers taking turns pummeling Webb and his story.
> On Oct. 4, 1996, the Washington Post published a front-page article
> knocking
> down Webb's series, although acknowledging that some Contra operatives did
> help the cocaine cartels. The Post's approach fit with the Big Media's
> cognitive dissonance on the topic: first, the Post called the
> Contra-cocaine
> allegations old news -- "even CIA personnel testified to Congress they knew
> that those covert operations involved drug traffickers," the Post said --
> and
> second, the Post minimized the importance of the one Contra smuggling
> channel that Webb had highlighted in his series, saying it had not "played
> a
> major role in the emergence of crack."
> To add to the smug hoo-hah treatment that was enveloping Webb and his
> story,
> the Post published a sidebar story dismissing African-Americans as prone to
> "conspiracy fears."
> Next, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times weighed in with lengthy
> articles castigating Webb and "Dark Alliance." The big newspapers made much
> of the CIA's internal reviews in 1987 and 1988 -- almost a decade earlier --
> that supposedly had cleared the spy agency of any role in Contra-cocaine
> smuggling.
> But the first ominous sign for the CIA's cover-up emerged on Oct. 24, 1996,
> when CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz conceded before the Senate
> Intelligence Committee that the first CIA probe had lasted only12 days, and
> the second only three days. He promised a more thorough review.
> Mocking Webb
> But Webb had already crossed over from being treated as a serious
> journalist
> to becoming a target of ridicule. Influential Washington Post media critic
> Howard Kurtz mocked Webb for saying in a book proposal that he would
> explore
> the possibility that the Contra war was primarily a business to its
> participants. "Oliver Stone, check your voice mail," Kurtz smirked.
> Yet, Webb's suspicion was no conspiracy theory. Indeed, Oliver North's
> chief
> Contra emissary, Rob Owen, had made the same point in a March 17, 1986
> message about the Contra leadership. "Few of the so-called leaders of the
> movement . . . really care about the boys in the field," Owen wrote. "THIS
> WAR HAS BECOME A BUSINESS TO MANY OF THEM." [Emphasis in original.]
> Ainsworth and other pro-Contra activists were reaching the same conclusion,
> that the Contra leadership was skimming money from the supply lines and
> padding their personal wealth with proceeds from the drug trade. According
> to a Jan. 21, 1987 interview report by the FBI, Ainsworth said he had "made
> inquiries in the local San Francisco Nicaraguan community and wondered
> among
> his acquaintances what Adolfo Calero and the other people in the FDN
> movement were doing and the word that he received back is that they were
> probably engaged in cocaine smuggling."
> In other words, Webb was right about the suspicion that the Contra movement
> had become less a cause than a business to many of its participants. Even
> Oliver North's emissary reported on that reality. But truthfulness had
> ceased to be relevant in the media's hazing of Gary Webb.
> In another double standard, while Webb was held to the strictest standards
> of journalism, it was entirely all right for Kurtz -- the supposed arbiter
> of
> journalistic integrity who was a longtime fixture on CNN's "Reliable
> Sources" -- to make judgments based on ignorance. Kurtz would face no
> repercussions for mocking a fellow journalist who was factually correct.
> The Big Three's assault -- combined with their disparaging tone -- had a
> predictable effect on the executives of the Mercury-News. As it turned out,
> Webb's confidence in his editors had been misplaced. By early 1997,
> executive editor Jerry Ceppos, who had his own corporate career to worry
> about, was in retreat.
> On May 11, 1997, Ceppos published a front-page column saying the series
> "fell short of my standards." He criticized the stories because they
> "strongly implied CIA knowledge" of Contra connections to U.S. drug dealers
> who were manufacturing crack cocaine. "We did not have enough proof that
> top
> CIA officials knew of the relationship," Ceppos wrote.
> Ceppos was wrong about the proof, of course. At AP, before we published our
> first Contra-cocaine article in 1985, Barger and I had known that the CIA
> and Reagan's White House were aware of the Contra-cocaine problem at senior
> levels. One of our sources was on Reagan's National Security Council staff.
> However, Ceppos recognized that he and his newspaper were facing a
> credibility crisis brought on by the harsh consensus delivered by the Big
> Three, a judgment that had quickly solidified into conventional wisdom
> throughout the major news media and inside Knight-Ridder, Inc., which owned
> the Mercury-News. The only career-saving move - career-saving for Ceppos
> even if career-destroying for Webb - was to jettison Webb and the
> Contra-cocaine investigative project.
> A 'Vindication'
> The big newspapers and the Contras' defenders celebrated Ceppos's retreat
> as
> vindication of their own dismissal of the Contra-cocaine stories. In
> particular, Kurtz seemed proud that his demeaning of Webb now had the
> endorsement of Webb's editor. Ceppos next pulled the plug on the
> Mercury-News' continuing Contra-cocaine investigation and reassigned Webb
> to
> a small office in Cupertino, California, far from his family. Webb resigned
> from the paper in disgrace. [See Consortiumnews.com's "Hung Out to Dry."]
> For undercutting Webb and other Mercury News reporters working on the
> Contra-cocaine project - some of whom were facing personal danger in
> Central
> America - Ceppos was lauded by the American Journalism Review and received
> the 1997 national Ethics in Journalism Award by the Society of Professional
> Journalists.
> While Ceppos won raves, Webb watched his career collapse and his marriage
> break up. Still, Gary Webb had set in motion internal government
> investigations that would bring to the surface long-hidden facts about how
> the Reagan administration had conducted the Contra war.
> The CIA published the first part of Inspector General Hitz's findings on
> Jan. 29, 1998. Though the CIA's press release for the report criticized
> Webb
> and defended the CIA, Hitz's Volume One admitted that not only were many of
> Webb's allegations true but that he actually understated the seriousness of
> the Contra-drug crimes and the CIA's knowledge of them.
> Hitz conceded that cocaine smugglers played a significant early role in the
> Contra movement and that the CIA intervened to block an image-threatening
> 1984 federal investigation into a San Francisco-based drug ring with
> suspected ties to the Contras, the so-called "Frogman Case."
> After Volume One was released, I called Webb (whom I had spent some time
> with since his series was published). I chided him for indeed getting the
> story "wrong." He had understated how serious the problem of Contra-cocaine
> trafficking had been, I said.
> It was a form of gallows humor for the two of us, since nothing had changed
> in the way the major newspapers treated the Contra-cocaine issue. They
> focused only on the press release that continued to attack Webb, while
> ignoring the incriminating information that could be found in the full
> report. All I could do was highlight those admissions at
> Consortiumnews.com,
> which sadly had a much, much smaller readership than the Big Three.
> The major U.S. news media also looked the other way on other startling
> disclosures.
> On May 7, 1998, for instance, Rep. Maxine Waters, a California Democrat,
> introduced into the Congressional Record a Feb. 11, 1982 letter of
> understanding between the CIA and the Justice Department. The letter, which
> had been requested by CIA Director William Casey, freed the CIA from legal
> requirements that it must report drug smuggling by CIA assets, a provision
> that covered the Nicaraguan Contras and the Afghan mujahedeen.
> In other words, early in those two covert wars, the CIA leadership wanted
> to
> make sure that its geopolitical objectives would not be complicated by a
> legal requirement to turn in its client forces for drug trafficking.
> Justice Denied
> The next break in the long-running Contra-cocaine cover-up was a report by
> the Justice Department's Inspector General Michael Bromwich. Given the
> hostile climate surrounding Webb's series, Bromwich's report also opened
> with criticism of Webb. But, like the CIA's Volume One, the contents
> revealed new details about serious government wrongdoing.
> According to evidence cited by Bromwich, the Reagan administration knew
> almost from the outset of the Contra war that cocaine traffickers permeated
> the paramilitary operation. The administration also did next to nothing to
> expose or stop the crimes. Bromwich's report revealed example after example
> of leads not followed, corroborated witnesses disparaged, official
> law-enforcement investigations sabotaged, and even the CIA facilitating the
> work of drug traffickers.
> The report showed that the Contras and their supporters ran several
> parallel
> drug-smuggling operations, not just the one at the center of Webb's series.
> The report also found that the CIA shared little of its information about
> Contra drugs with law-enforcement agencies and on three occasions disrupted
> cocaine-trafficking investigations that threatened the Contras.
> As well as depicting a more widespread Contra-drug operation than Webb (or
> Barger and I) had understood, the Justice Department report provided some
> important corroboration about Nicaraguan drug smuggler Norwin Meneses, a
> key
> figure in Gary Webb's series and Adolfo Calero's friend as described by
> Dennis Ainsworth.
> Bromwich cited U.S. government informants who supplied detailed information
> about Meneses's drug operation and his financial assistance to the Contras.
> For instance, Renato Pena, the money-and-drug courier for Meneses, said
> that
> in the early 1980s the CIA allowed the Contras to fly drugs into the United
> States, sell them, and keep the proceeds. Pena, the FDN's northern
> California representative, said the drug trafficking was forced on the
> Contras by the inadequate levels of U.S. government assistance.
> The Justice Department report also disclosed repeated examples of the CIA
> and U.S. embassies in Central America discouraging DEA investigations,
> including one into Contra-cocaine shipments moving through the
> international
> airport in El Salvador. Bromwich said secrecy trumped all. "We have no
> doubt
> that the CIA and the U.S. Embassy were not anxious for the DEA to pursue
> its
> investigation at the airport," he wrote.
> Bromwich also described the curious case of how a DEA pilot helped a CIA
> asset escape from Costa Rican authorities in 1989 after the man, American
> farmer John Hull, had been charged in connection with Contra-cocaine
> trafficking. [See Consortiumnews.com's "John Hull's Great Escape."]
> Hull's ranch in northern Costa Rica had been the site of Contra camps for
> attacking Nicaragua from the south. For years, Contra-connected witnesses
> also said Hull's property was used for the transshipment of cocaine en
> route
> to the United States, but those accounts were brushed aside by the Reagan
> administration and disparaged in major U.S. newspapers.
> Yet, according to Bromwich's report, the DEA took the accounts seriously
> enough to prepare a research report on the evidence in November 1986. One
> informant described Colombian cocaine off-loaded at an airstrip on Hull's
> ranch.
> The drugs were then concealed in a shipment of frozen shrimp and
> transported
> to the United States. The alleged Costa Rican shipper was Frigorificos de
> Puntarenas, a firm controlled by Cuban-American Luis Rodriguez. Like Hull,
> however, Frigorificos had friends in high places. In 1985-86, the State
> Department had selected the shrimp company to handle $261,937 in non-lethal
> assistance earmarked for the Contras.
> Hull also remained a man with powerful protectors. Even after Costa Rican
> authorities brought drug charges against him, influential Americans,
> including Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Indiana, demanded that Hull be let out of
> jail pending trial. Then, in July 1989 with the help of a DEA pilot - and
> possibly a DEA agent - Hull managed to fly out of Costa Rica to Haiti and
> then to the United States.
> Despite these startling new disclosures, the big newspapers still showed no
> inclination to read beyond the criticism of Webb in the press release.
> Major Disclosures
> By fall 1998, Washington was obsessed with President Bill Clinton's Monica
> Lewinsky sex scandal, which made it easier to ignore even more stunning
> Contra-cocaine disclosures in the CIA's Volume Two, published on Oct. 8,
> 1998.
> In the report, CIA Inspector General Hitz identified more than 50 Contras
> and Contra-related entities implicated in the drug trade. He also detailed
> how the Reagan administration had protected these drug operations and
> frustrated federal investigations throughout the 1980s.
> According to Volume Two, the CIA knew the criminal nature of its Contra
> clients from the start of the war against Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista
> government. The earliest Contra force, called the Nicaraguan Revolutionary
> Democratic Alliance (ADREN) or the 15th of September Legion, had chosen "to
> stoop to criminal activities in order to feed and clothe their cadre,"
> according to a June 1981 draft of a CIA field report.
> According to a September 1981 cable to CIA headquarters, two ADREN members
> made the first delivery of drugs to Miami in July 1981. ADREN's leaders
> included Enrique Bermúdez and other early Contras who would later direct
> the
> major Contra army, the CIA-organized FDN which was based in Honduras, along
> Nicaragua's northern border.
> Throughout the war, Bermúdez remained the top Contra military commander.
> The
> CIA later corroborated the allegations about ADREN's cocaine trafficking,
> but insisted that Bermúdez had opposed the drug shipments to the United
> States that went ahead nonetheless.
> The truth about Bermúdez's supposed objections to drug trafficking,
> however,
> was less clear. According to Hitz's Volume One, Bermúdez enlisted Norwin
> Meneses - the Nicaraguan cocaine smuggler, the friend of Adolfo Calero, and
> a key figure in Webb's series - to raise money and buy supplies for the
> Contras.
> Volume One had quoted another Nicaraguan trafficker, Danilo Blandón, a
> Meneses associate (and another lead character in Webb's series), as telling
> Hitz's investigators that he (Blandón) and Meneses flew to Honduras to meet
> with Bermúdez in 1982. At the time, Meneses's criminal activities were
> well-known in the Nicaraguan exile community, but Bermúdez told the cocaine
> smugglers that "the ends justify the means" in raising money for the
> Contras.
> After the Bermúdez meeting, Meneses and Blandón were briefly arrested by
> Honduran police who confiscated $100,000 that the police suspected was to
> be
> a payment for a drug transaction. The Contras intervened, gained freedom
> for
> the two traffickers and got them their money back by saying the cash, which
> indeed was for a cocaine purchase in Bolivia, belonged to the Contras.
> There were other indications of Bermúdez's drug-smuggling complicity. In
> February 1988, another Nicaraguan exile linked to the drug trade accused
> Bermúdez of participation in narcotics trafficking, according to Hitz's
> report. After the Contra war ended, Bermúdez returned to Managua,
> Nicaragua,
> where he was shot to death on Feb. 16, 1991. The murder has never been
> solved.
> The Southern Front
> Along the Southern Front, the Contras' military operations in Costa Rica on
> Nicaragua's southern border, the CIA's drug evidence centered on the forces
> of Edén Pastora, another top Contra commander. But Hitz discovered that the
> U.S. government may have made the drug situation worse, not better.
> Hitz revealed that the CIA put an admitted drug operative -- known by his
> CIA
> pseudonym "Ivan Gomez" -- in a supervisory position over Pastora. Hitz
> reported that the CIA discovered Gomez's drug history in 1987 when Gomez
> failed a security review on drug-trafficking questions.
> In internal CIA interviews, Gomez admitted that in March or April 1982, he
> helped family members who were engaged in drug trafficking and money
> laundering. In one case, Gomez said he assisted his brother and
> brother-in-law transporting cash from New York City to Miami. He admitted
> he
> "knew this act was illegal."
> Later, Gomez expanded on his admission, describing how his family members
> had fallen $2 million into debt and had gone to Miami to run a
> money-laundering center for drug traffickers. Gomez said "his brother had
> many visitors whom [Gomez] assumed to be in the drug trafficking business."
> Gomez's brother was arrested on drug charges in June 1982. Three months
> later, in September 1982, Gomez started his CIA assignment in Costa Rica.
> Years later, convicted drug trafficker Carlos Cabezas alleged that in the
> early 1980s, Ivan Gomez was the CIA agent in Costa Rica who was overseeing
> drug-money donations to the Contras. Gomez "was to make sure the money was
> given to the right people [the Contras] and nobody was taking . . .
> profit
> they weren't supposed to," Cabezas stated publicly.
> But the CIA sought to discredit Cabezas at the time because he had trouble
> identifying Gomez's picture and put Gomez at one meeting in early 1982
> before Gomez started his CIA assignment. While the CIA was able to fend off
> Cabezas's allegations by pointing to these minor discrepancies, Hitz's
> report revealed that the CIA was nevertheless aware of Gomez's direct role
> in drug-money laundering, a fact the agency hid from Sen. Kerry in his
> investigation during the late 1980s.
> There was also more to know about Gomez. In November 1985, the FBI learned
> from an informant that Gomez's two brothers had been large-scale cocaine
> importers, with one brother arranging shipments from Bolivia's infamous
> drug
> kingpin Roberto Suarez.
> Suarez already was known as a financier of right-wing causes. In 1980, with
> the support of Argentina's hard-line anticommunist military regime, Suarez
> bankrolled a coup in Bolivia that ousted the elected left-of-center
> government. The violent putsch became known as the Cocaine Coup because it
> made Bolivia the region's first narco-state.
> By protecting cocaine shipments headed north, Bolivia's government helped
> transform Colombia's Medellín cartel from a struggling local operation into
> a giant corporate-style business for delivering vast quantities of cocaine
> to the U.S. market.
> Flush with cash in the early 1980s, Suarez invested more than $30 million
> in
> various right-wing paramilitary operations, including the Contra forces in
> Central America, according to U.S. Senate testimony by an Argentine
> intelligence officer, Leonardo Sanchez-Reisse.
> In 1987, Sanchez-Reisse said the Suarez drug money was laundered through
> front companies in Miami before going to Central America. There, other
> Argentine intelligence officers -- veterans of the Bolivian coup -- trained
> the Contras in the early 1980s, even before the CIA arrived to first assist
> with the training and later take over the Contra operation from the
> Argentines.
> Inspector General Hitz added another piece to the mystery of the
> Bolivian-Contra connection. One Contra fund-raiser, Jose Orlando Bolanos,
> boasted that the Argentine government was supporting his Contra activities,
> according to a May 1982 cable to CIA headquarters. Bolanos made the
> statement during a meeting with undercover DEA agents in Florida. He even
> offered to introduce them to his Bolivian cocaine supplier.
> Despite all this suspicious drug activity centered around Ivan Gomez and
> the
> Contras, the CIA insisted that it did not unmask Gomez until 1987, when he
> failed a security check and confessed his role in his family's drug
> business. The CIA official who interviewed Gomez concluded that "Gomez
> directly participated in illegal drug transactions, concealed participation
> in illegal drug transactions, and concealed information about involvement
> in
> illegal drug activity," Hitz wrote.
> But senior CIA officials still protected Gomez. They refused to refer the
> Gomez case to the Justice Department, citing the 1982 agreement that spared
> the CIA from a legal obligation to report narcotics crimes by people
> collaborating with the CIA who were not formal agency employees. Gomez was
> an independent contractor who worked for the CIA but was not officially on
> staff. The CIA eased Gomez out of the agency in February 1988, without
> alerting law enforcement or the congressional oversight committees.
> When questioned about the case nearly a decade later, one senior CIA
> official who had supported the gentle treatment of Gomez had second
> thoughts. "It is a striking commentary on me and everyone that this guy's
> involvement in narcotics didn't weigh more heavily on me or the system,"
> the
> official told Hitz's investigators.
> Drug Path to the White House
> A Medellín drug connection arose in another section of Hitz's report, when
> he revealed evidence suggesting that some Contra trafficking may have been
> sanctioned by Reagan's National Security Council. The protagonist for this
> part of the Contra-cocaine mystery was Moises Nunez, a Cuban-American who
> worked for Oliver North's NSC Contra-support operation and for two
> drug-connected seafood importers, Ocean Hunter in Miami and Frigorificos De
> Puntarenas in Costa Rica.
> Frigorificos De Puntarenas was created in the early 1980s as a cover for
> drug-money laundering, according to sworn testimony by two of the firm's
> principals -- Carlos Soto and Medellín cartel accountant Ramon Milian
> Rodriguez. (It was also the company implicated by a DEA informant in moving
> cocaine from John Hull's ranch to the United States.)
> Drug allegations were swirling around Moises Nunez by the mid-1980s.
> Indeed,
> his operation was one of the targets of my and Barger's AP investigation in
> 1985. Finally reacting to the suspicions, the CIA questioned Nunez about
> his
> alleged cocaine trafficking on March 25, 1987. He responded by pointing the
> finger at his NSC superiors.
> "Nunez revealed that since 1985, he had engaged in a clandestine
> relationship with the National Security Council," Hitz reported, adding:
> "Nunez refused to elaborate on the nature of these actions, but indicated
> it
> was difficult to answer questions relating to his involvement in narcotics
> trafficking because of the specific tasks he had performed at the direction
> of the NSC. Nunez refused to identify the NSC officials with whom he had
> been involved."
> After this first round of questioning, CIA headquarters authorized an
> additional session, but then senior CIA officials reversed the decision.
> There would be no further efforts at "debriefing Nunez."
> Hitz noted that "the cable [from headquarters] offered no explanation for
> the decision" to stop the Nunez interrogation. But the CIA's Central
> American Task Force chief Alan Fiers Jr. said the Nunez-NSC drug lead was
> not pursued "because of the NSC connection and the possibility that this
> could be somehow connected to the Private Benefactor program [the Contra
> money handled by the NSC's Oliver North] a decision was made not to pursue
> this matter."
> Joseph Fernandez, who had been the CIA's station chief in Costa Rica,
> confirmed to congressional Iran-Contra investigators that Nunez "was
> involved in a very sensitive operation" for North's "Enterprise." The exact
> nature of that NSC-authorized activity has never been divulged.
> At the time of the Nunez-NSC drug admissions and his truncated
> interrogation, the CIA's acting director was Robert Gates, who nearly two
> decades later became President George W. Bush's second secretary of
> defense,
> a position he retained under President Barack Obama.
> Drug Record
> The CIA also worked directly with other drug-connected Cuban-Americans on
> the Contra project, Hitz found. One of Nunez's Cuban-American associates,
> Felipe Vidal, had a criminal record as a narcotics trafficker in the 1970s.
> But the CIA still hired him to serve as a logistics coordinator for the
> Contras, Hitz reported.
> The CIA also learned that Vidal's drug connections were not only in the
> past. A December 1984 cable to CIA headquarters revealed Vidal's ties to
> Rene Corvo, another Cuban-American suspected of drug trafficking. Corvo was
> working with Cuban anticommunist Frank Castro, who was viewed as a Medellín
> cartel representative within the Contra movement.
> There were other narcotics links to Vidal. In January 1986, the DEA in
> Miami
> seized 414 pounds of cocaine concealed in a shipment of yucca that was
> going
> from a Contra operative in Costa Rica to Ocean Hunter, the company where
> Vidal (and Moises Nunez) worked. Despite the evidence, Vidal remained a CIA
> employee as he collaborated with Frank Castro's assistant, Rene Corvo, in
> raising money for the Contras, according to a CIA memo in June 1986.
> By fall 1986, Sen. Kerry had heard enough rumors about Vidal to demand
> information about him as part of his congressional inquiry into Contra
> drugs. But the CIA withheld the derogatory information in its files. On
> Oct.
> 15, 1986, Kerry received a briefing from the CIA's Alan Fiers, who didn't
> mention Vidal's drug arrests and conviction in the 1970s.
> But Vidal was not yet in the clear. In 1987, the U.S. Attorney's Office in
> Miami began investigating Vidal, Ocean Hunter, and other Contra-connected
> entities. This prosecutorial attention worried the CIA. The CIA's Latin
> American division felt it was time for a security review of Vidal. But on
> Aug. 5, 1987, the CIA's security office blocked the review for fear that
> the
> Vidal drug information "could be exposed during any future litigation."
> As expected, the U.S. Attorney's Office did request documents about
> "Contra-related activities" by Vidal, Ocean Hunter, and 16 other entities.
> The CIA advised the prosecutor that "no information had been found
> regarding
> Ocean Hunter," a statement that was clearly false. The CIA continued
> Vidal's
> employment as an adviser to the Contra movement until 1990, virtually the
> end of the Contra war.
> Hitz also revealed that drugs tainted the highest levels of the
> Honduran-based FDN, the largest Contra army. Hitz found that Juan Rivas, a
> Contra commander who rose to be chief of staff, admitted that he had been a
> cocaine trafficker in Colombia before the war.
> The CIA asked Rivas, known as El Quiche, about his background after the DEA
> began suspecting that Rivas might be an escaped convict from a Colombian
> prison. In interviews with CIA officers, Rivas acknowledged that he had
> been
> arrested and convicted of packaging and transporting cocaine for the drug
> trade in Barranquilla, Colombia. After several months in prison, Rivas
> said,
> he escaped and moved to Central America, where he joined the Contras.
> Defending Rivas, CIA officials insisted that there was no evidence that
> Rivas engaged in trafficking while with the Contras. But one CIA cable
> noted
> that he lived an expensive lifestyle, even keeping a $100,000 Thoroughbred
> horse at the Contra camp. Contra military commander Bermúdez later
> attributed Rivas's wealth to his ex-girlfriend's rich family. But a CIA
> cable in March 1989 added that "some in the FDN may have suspected at the
> time that the father-in-law was engaged in drug trafficking."
> Still, the CIA moved quickly to protect Rivas from exposure and possible
> extradition to Colombia. In February 1989, CIA headquarters asked that the
> DEA take no action "in view of the serious political damage to the U.S.
> Government that could occur should the information about Rivas become
> public." Rivas was eased out of the Contra leadership with an explanation
> of
> poor health. With U.S. government help, he was allowed to resettle in
> Miami.
> Colombia was not informed about his fugitive status.
> Another senior FDN official implicated in the drug trade was its chief
> spokesman in Honduras, Arnoldo Jose "Frank" Arana. The drug allegations
> against Arana dated back to 1983 when a federal narcotics task force put
> him
> under criminal investigation because of plans "to smuggle 100 kilograms of
> cocaine into the United States from South America." On Jan. 23, 1986, the
> FBI reported that Arana and his brothers were involved in a drug-smuggling
> enterprise, although Arana was not charged.
> Arana sought to clear up another set of drug suspicions in 1989 by visiting
> the DEA in Honduras with a business associate, Jose Perez. Arana's
> association with Perez, however, only raised new alarms. If "Arana is mixed
> up with the Perez brothers, he is probably dirty," the DEA said.
> Drug Airlines
> Through their ownership of an air services company called SETCO, the Perez
> brothers were associated with Juan Matta-Ballesteros, a major cocaine
> kingpin connected to the 1985 torture-murder of DEA agent Enrique "Kiki"
> Camarena, according to reports by the DEA and U.S. Customs. Hitz reported
> that someone at the CIA scribbled a note on a DEA cable about Arana
> stating:
> "Arnold Arana . . . still active and working, we [CIA] may have a problem."
> Despite its drug ties to Matta-Ballesteros, SETCO emerged as the principal
> company for ferrying supplies to the Contras in Honduras. During
> congressional Iran-Contra hearings, FDN political leader Adolfo Calero
> testified that SETCO was paid from bank accounts controlled by Oliver
> North.
> SETCO also received $185,924 from the State Department for delivering
> supplies to the Contras in 1986. Furthermore, Hitz found that other air
> transport companies used by the Contras were implicated in the cocaine
> trade
> as well.
> Even FDN leaders suspected that they were shipping supplies to Central
> America aboard planes that might be returning with drugs. Mario Calero,
> Adolfo Calero's brother and the chief of Contra logistics, grew so uneasy
> about one air freight company that he notified U.S. law enforcement that
> the
> FDN only chartered the planes for the flights south, not the return flights
> north.
> Hitz found that some drug pilots simply rotated from one sector of the
> Contra operation to another. Donaldo Frixone, who had a drug record in the
> Dominican Republic, was hired by the CIA to fly Contra missions from 1983
> to
> 1985. In September 1986, however, Frixone was implicated in smuggling
> 19,000
> pounds of marijuana into the United States. In late 1986 or early 1987, he
> went to work for Vortex, another U.S.-paid Contra supply company linked to
> the drug trade.
> By the time that Hitz's Volume Two was published in fall 1998, the CIA's
> defense against Webb's series had shrunk to a fig leaf: that the CIA did
> not
> conspire with the Contras to raise money through cocaine trafficking. But
> Hitz made clear that the Contra war took precedence over law enforcement
> and
> that the CIA withheld evidence of Contra crimes from the Justice
> Department,
> Congress, and even the CIA's own analytical division.
> Besides tracing the evidence of Contra-drug trafficking through the
> decade-long Contra war, the inspector general interviewed senior CIA
> officers who acknowledged that they were aware of the Contra-drug problem
> but didn't want its exposure to undermine the struggle to overthrow
> Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government.
> According to Hitz, the CIA had "one overriding priority: to oust the
> Sandinista government. . . . [CIA officers] were determined that the
> various
> difficulties they encountered not be allowed to prevent effective
> implementation of the Contra program." One CIA field officer explained,
> "The
> focus was to get the job done, get the support and win the war."
> Hitz also recounted complaints from CIA analysts that CIA operations
> officers handling the Contras hid evidence of Contra-drug trafficking even
> from the CIA's analysts.
> Because of the withheld evidence, the CIA analysts incorrectly concluded in
> the mid-1980s that "only a handful of Contras might have been involved in
> drug trafficking." That false assessment was passed on to Congress and to
> major news organizations -- serving as an important basis for denouncing
> Gary
> Webb and his "Dark Alliance" series in 1996.
> CIA Admission
> Although Hitz's report was an extraordinary admission of institutional
> guilt
> by the CIA, it went almost unnoticed by the big American newspapers.
> On Oct. 10, 1998, two days after Hitz's Volume Two was posted on the CIA's
> Web site, the New York Times published a brief article that continued to
> deride Webb but acknowledged the Contra-drug problem may have been worse
> than earlier understood. Several weeks later, the Washington Post weighed
> in
> with a story that simply missed the point of the CIA's confession. Though
> having assigned 17 journalists to tear down Webb's reporting, the Los
> Angeles Times chose not to publish a story on the release of Hitz's Volume
> Two.
> In 2000, the House Intelligence Committee grudgingly acknowledged that the
> stories about Reagan's CIA protecting Contra drug traffickers were true.
> The
> committee released a report citing classified testimony from CIA Inspector
> General Britt Snider (Hitz's successor) admitting that the spy agency had
> turned a blind eye to evidence of Contra-drug smuggling and generally
> treated drug smuggling through Central America as a low priority.
> "In the end the objective of unseating the Sandinistas appears to have
> taken
> precedence over dealing properly with potentially serious allegations
> against those with whom the agency was working," Snider said, adding that
> the CIA did not treat the drug allegations in "a consistent, reasoned or
> justifiable manner."
> The House committee -- then controlled by Republicans -- still downplayed the
> significance of the Contra-cocaine scandal, but the panel acknowledged,
> deep
> inside its report, that in some cases, "CIA employees did nothing to verify
> or disprove drug trafficking information, even when they had the
> opportunity
> to do so. In some of these, receipt of a drug allegation appeared to
> provoke
> no specific response, and business went on as usual."
> Like the release of Hitz's report in 1998, the admissions by Snider and the
> House committee drew virtually no media attention in 2000 -- except for a
> few
> articles on the Internet, including one at Consortiumnews.com.
> Because of this journalistic misconduct by the Big Three newspapers --
> choosing to conceal their own neglect of the Contra-cocaine scandal and to
> protect the Reagan administration's image -- Webb's reputation was never
> rehabilitated.
> After his original "Dark Alliance" series was published in 1996, I joined
> Webb in a few speaking appearances on the West Coast, including one packed
> book talk at the Midnight Special bookstore in Santa Monica, California.
> For
> a time, Webb was treated as a celebrity on the American Left, but that
> gradually faded.
> In our interactions during these joint appearances, I found Webb to be a
> regular guy who seemed to be holding up fairly well under the terrible
> pressure. He had landed an investigative job with a California state
> legislative committee. He also felt some measure of vindication when CIA
> Inspector General Hitz's reports came out.
> But Webb never could overcome the pain caused by his betrayal at the hands
> of his journalistic colleagues, his peers. In the years that followed, Webb
> was unable to find decent-paying work in his profession -- the conventional
> wisdom remained that he had somehow been exposed as a journalistic fraud.
> His state job ended; his marriage fell apart; he struggled to pay bills;
> and
> he was faced with a forced move out of a house near Sacramento, California,
> and in with his mother.
> On Dec. 9, 2004, the 49-year-old Webb typed out suicide notes to his
> ex-wife
> and his three children; laid out a certificate for his cremation; and taped
> a note on the door telling movers -- who were coming the next morning -- to
> instead call 911. Webb then took out his father's pistol and shot himself
> in
> the head. The first shot was not lethal, so he fired once more.
> Even with Webb's death, the big newspapers that had played key roles in his
> destruction couldn't bring themselves to show Webb any mercy. After Webb's
> body was found, I received a call from a reporter for the Los Angeles Times
> who knew that I was one of Webb's few journalistic colleagues who had
> defended him and his work.
> I told the reporter that American history owed a great debt to Gary Webb
> because he had forced out important facts about Reagan-era crimes. But I
> added that the Los Angeles Times would be hard-pressed to write an honest
> obituary because the newspaper had ignored Hitz's final report, which had
> largely vindicated Webb.
> To my disappointment but not my surprise, I was correct. The Los Angeles
> Times ran a mean-spirited obituary that made no mention of either my
> defense
> of Webb, nor the CIA's admissions in 1998. The obituary was republished in
> other newspapers, including the Washington Post.
> In effect, Webb's suicide enabled senior editors at the Big Three
> newspapers
> to breathe a little easier -- one of the few people who understood the ugly
> story of the Reagan administration's cover-up of the Contra-cocaine scandal
> and the U.S. media's complicity was now silenced.
> To this day, none of the journalists or media critics who participated in
> the destruction of Gary Webb has paid a price. None has faced the sort of
> humiliation that Webb had to endure. None had to experience that special
> pain of standing up for what is best in the profession of journalism --
> taking on a difficult story that seeks to hold powerful people accountable
> for serious crimes -- and then being vilified by your own colleagues, the
> people that you expected to understand and appreciate what you had done.
> On the contrary, many were rewarded with professional advancement and
> lucrative careers. For instance, for years, Howard Kurtz got to host the
> CNN
> program, "Reliable Sources," which lectured journalists on professional
> standards. He was described in the program's bio as "the nation's premier
> media critic." (His show has since moved to Fox News, renamed "MediaBuzz.")
> The rehabilitation of Webb's reputation and the correction of this dark
> chapter of American history now rest on how the public responds to the
> presentation of Webb's story in the film, "Kill the Messenger." It's also
> unclear how the Big Media will react. Last Sunday, New York Times' media
> writer David Carr continued some of the old quibbling about Webb's series
> but did acknowledge the Contra-cocaine reality.
> Carr's movie review began with a straightforward recognition of the
> long-denied truth: "If someone told you today that there was strong
> evidence
> that the Central Intelligence Agency once turned a blind eye to accusations
> of drug dealing by operatives it worked with, it might ring some distant,
> skeptical bell. Did that really happen? That really happened."
> Yes, that really happened.
> Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. Error! Hyperlink reference not
> valid.
>
> Former U.S. president Ronald Reagan. (photo: unknown)
> http://consortiumnews.com/2014/10/09/the-sordid-contra-cocaine-saga/http://c
> onsortiumnews.com/2014/10/09/the-sordid-contra-cocaine-saga/
> The Sordid Contra-Cocaine Saga
> By Robert Parry, Consortium News
> 10 October 14
> he movie, "Kill the Messenger," is forcing the mainstream U.S. media to
> confront one of its most shameful episodes, the suppression of a major
> national security scandal implicating Ronald Reagan's CIA in aiding and
> abetting cocaine trafficking by the Nicaraguan Contra rebels in the 1980s
> and then the systematic destruction of journalist Gary Webb when he revived
> the scandal in the 1990s.
> Hollywood's treatment of this sordid affair will likely draw another
> defensive or dismissive response from some of the big news outlets that
> still don't want to face up to their disgraceful behavior. The New York
> Times and other major newspapers mocked the Contra-cocaine scandal when
> Brian Barger and I first exposed it in 1985 for the Associated Press and
> then savaged Webb in 1996 when he traced some of the Contra-cocaine into
> the
> manufacture of crack which ravaged American cities.
> So, when you're watching this movie or responding to questions from friends
> about whether they should believe its storyline, you might want to know
> what
> is or is not fact. What is remarkable about this tale is that so much of it
> now has been established by official government documents. In other words,
> you don't have to believe me and my dozens of sources; you can turn to the
> admissions by the Central Intelligence Agency's inspector general or to
> evidence in the National Archives.
> For instance, last year at the National Archives annex in College Park,
> Maryland, I discovered a "secret" U.S. law enforcement report that detailed
> how top Contra leader Adolfo Calero was casually associating with Norwin
> Meneses, described as "a well-reputed drug dealer."
> Meneses was near the center of Webb's 1996 articles for the San Jose
> Mercury-News, a series that came under fierce attack from U.S. government
> officials as well as major news organizations, including the New York
> Times,
> the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. The controversy cost Webb
> his
> career, left him nearly penniless and ultimately drove him to suicide on
> Dec. 9, 2004.
> But the bitter irony of Webb's demise, which is the subject of "Kill the
> Messenger" starring Jeremy Renner as Webb, is that Webb's much-maligned
> "Dark Alliance" series eventually forced major admissions from the CIA, the
> Justice Department and other government agencies revealing an even-deeper
> relationship between President Reagan's beloved Contras and drug cartels
> than Webb (or Barger and I) ever alleged.
> Typical of the evidence that the Reagan administration chose to ignore was
> the document that I found at the National Archives, recounting information
> from Dennis Ainsworth, a blue-blood Republican from San Francisco who
> volunteered to help the Contra cause in 1984-85. That put him in position
> to
> witness the strange behind-the-scenes activities of Contra leaders
> hobnobbing with drug traffickers and negotiating arms deals with White
> House
> emissaries.
> Ainsworth also was a source of mine in fall 1985 when I was investigating
> the mysterious sources of funding for the Contras after Congress shut off
> CIA support in 1984 amid widespread reports of Contra atrocities inflicted
> on Nicaraguan civilians, including rapes, executions and torture.
> Ainsworth's first-hand knowledge of the Contra dealings dovetailed with
> information that I already had, such as the central role of National
> Security Council aide Oliver North in aiding the Contras and his use of
> "courier" Rob Owen as an off-the-books White House intermediary to the
> Contras. I later developed confirmation of some other details that
> Ainsworth
> described, such as his overhearing Owen and Calero working together on an
> arms deal as Ainsworth drove them through the streets of San Francisco.
> As for Ainsworth's knowledge about the Contra-cocaine connection, he said
> he
> sponsored a June 1984 cocktail party at which Calero spoke to about 60
> people. Meneses, a notorious drug kingpin in the Nicaraguan community,
> showed up uninvited and clearly had a personal relationship with Calero,
> who
> was then the political leader of the Contra's chief fighting force, the
> CIA-backed Nicaraguan Democratic Force (or FDN).
> "At the end of the cocktail party, Meneses and Calero went off together,"
> Ainsworth told U.S. Attorney Joseph P. Russoniello, according to a "secret"
> Jan. 6, 1987 cable submitted by Russoniello to an FBI investigation
> code-named "Front Door," a probe into the Reagan administration's
> corruption.
> After Calero's speech, Ainsworth said Meneses accompanied Calero and about
> 20 people to dinner and picked up the entire tab, according to a more
> detailed debriefing of Ainsworth by the FBI. Concerned about this
> relationship, Ainsworth said he was told by Renato Pena, an FDN leader in
> the San Francisco area, that "the FDN is involved in drug smuggling with
> the
> aid of Norwin Meneses who also buys arms for Enrique Bermudez, a leader of
> the FDN." Bermudez was then the top Contra military commander.
> Corroborating Account
> Pena, who himself was convicted on federal drug charges in 1984, gave a
> similar account to the Drug Enforcement Administration. According to a 1998
> report by the Justice Department's Inspector General Michael Bromwich,
> "When
> debriefed by the DEA in the early 1980s, Pena said that the CIA was
> allowing
> the Contras to fly drugs into the United States, sell them, and keep the
> proceeds. ...
> "Pena stated that he was present on many occasions when Meneses telephoned
> Bermudez in Honduras. Meneses told Pena of Bermudez's requests for such
> things as gun silencers (which Pena said Meneses obtained in Los Angeles),
> cross bows, and other military equipment for the Contras. Pena believed
> that
> Meneses would sometimes transport certain of these items himself to Central
> America, and other times would have contacts in Los Angeles and Miami send
> cargo to Honduras, where the authorities were cooperating with the Contras.
> Pena believed Meneses had contact with Bermudez from about 1981 or 1982
> through the mid-1980s."
> Bromwich's report then added, "Pena said he was one of the couriers Meneses
> used to deliver drug money to a Colombian known as 'Carlos' in Los Angeles
> and return to San Francisco with cocaine. Pena made six to eight trips,
> with
> anywhere from $600,000 to nearly $1 million, and brought back six to eight
> kilos of cocaine each time. Pena said Meneses was moving hundreds of kilos
> a
> week. 'Carlos' once told Pena, 'We're helping your cause with this drug
> thing ... we are helping your organization a lot."
> Ainsworth also said he tried to alert Oliver North in 1985 about the
> troubling connections between the Contra movement and cocaine traffickers
> but that North turned a deaf ear. "In the spring some friends of mine and I
> went back to the White House staff but we were put off by Ollie North and
> others on the staff who really don't want to know all what's going on,"
> Ainsworth told Russoniello.
> When I first spoke with Ainsworth in September 1985 at a coffee shop in San
> Francisco, he asked for confidentiality which I granted. However, since the
> documents released by the National Archives include him describing his
> conversations with me, that confidentiality no longer applies. Ainsworth
> also spoke with Webb for his 1996 San Jose Mercury-News series under the
> pseudonym "David Morrison."
> Though I found Ainsworth to be generally reliable, some of his depictions
> of
> our conversations contained mild exaggerations or confusion over details,
> such as his claim that I called him from Costa Rica in January 1986 and
> told
> him that the Contra-cocaine story that I had been working on with my AP
> colleague Brian Barger "never hit the papers because it was suppressed by
> the Associated Press due to political pressure primarily from the CIA."
> In reality, Barger and I returned from Costa Rica in fall 1985, wrote our
> story about the Contras' involvement in cocaine smuggling, and pushed it
> onto the AP wire in December though in a reduced form because of resistance
> from some senior AP news executives who were supportive of President
> Reagan's foreign policies. The CIA, the White House and other agencies of
> the Reagan administration did seek to discredit our story, but they did not
> prevent its publication.
> An Overriding Hostility
> The Reagan administration's neglect of Ainsworth's insights reflected the
> overriding hostility toward any information - even from a Republican
> activist like Ainsworth - that put the Contras in a negative light. In
> early
> 1987, when Ainsworth spoke with U.S. Attorney Russoniello and the FBI, the
> Reagan administration was in full damage-control mode, trying to tamp down
> the Iran-Contra disclosures about Oliver North diverting profits from
> secret
> arms sales to Iran to the Contra war.
> Fears that the Iran-Contra scandal could lead to Reagan's impeachment made
> it even less likely that the Justice Department would pursue an
> investigation into drug ties implicating the Contra leadership. Ainsworth's
> information was simply passed on to Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh
> whose
> inquiry was already overwhelmed by the task of sorting out the convoluted
> Iran transactions.
> Publicly, the Reagan team continued dumping on the Contra-cocaine
> allegations and playing the find-any-possible-reason-to-reject-a-witness
> game. The major news media went along, leading to much mainstream ridicule
> of a 1989 investigative report by Sen. John Kerry, D-Massachusetts, who
> uncovered more drug connections implicating the Contras and the Reagan
> administration.
> Only occasionally, such as when the George H.W. Bush administration needed
> witnesses to convict Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega did the
> Contra-cocaine evidence pop onto Official Washington's radar.
> During Noriega's drug-trafficking trial in 1991, U.S. prosecutors called as
> a witness Colombian Medellín cartel kingpin Carlos Lehder, who -- along with
> implicating Noriega -- testified that the cartel had given $10 million to
> the
> Contras, an allegation first unearthed by Sen. Kerry. "The Kerry hearings
> didn't get the attention they deserved at the time," a Washington Post
> editorial on Nov. 27, 1991, acknowledged. "The Noriega trial brings this
> sordid aspect of the Nicaraguan engagement to fresh public attention."
> But the Post offered its readers no explanation for why Kerry's hearings
> had
> been largely ignored, with the Post itself a leading culprit in this
> journalistic misfeasance. Nor did the Post and the other leading newspapers
> use the opening created by the Noriega trial to do anything to rectify
> their
> past neglect.
> Everything quickly returned to the status quo in which the desired
> perception of the noble Contras trumped the clear reality of their criminal
> activities. Instead of recognizing the skewed moral compass of the Reagan
> administration, Congress was soon falling over itself to attach Reagan's
> name to as many public buildings and facilities as possible, including
> Washington's National Airport.
> Meanwhile, those of us in journalism who had exposed the national security
> crimes of the 1980s saw our careers mostly sink or go sideways. We were
> regarded as "pariahs" in our profession.
> As for me, shortly after the Iran-Contra scandal broke wide open in fall
> 1986, I accepted a job at Newsweek, one of the many mainstream news outlets
> that had long ignored Contra-connected scandals and briefly thought it
> needed to bolster its coverage. But I soon discovered that senior editors
> remained hostile toward the Iran-Contra story and related spinoff scandals,
> including the Contra-cocaine mess.
> After losing battle after battle with my Newsweek editors, I departed the
> magazine in June 1990 to write a book (called Fooling America) about the
> decline of the Washington press corps and the parallel rise of a new
> generation of government propagandists.
> I was also hired by PBS Frontline to investigate whether there had been a
> prequel to the Iran-Contra scandal -- whether those arms-for-hostage deals
> in
> the mid-1980s had been preceded by contacts between Reagan's 1980 campaign
> staff and Iran, which was then holding 52 Americans hostage and essentially
> destroying Jimmy Carter's reelection hopes. [For more on that topic, see
> Robert Parry's Secrecy & Privilege and America's Stolen Narrative.]
> Finding New Ways
> In 1995, frustrated by the growing triviality of American journalism -- and
> acting on the advice of and with the assistance of my oldest son Sam -- I
> turned to a new medium and launched the Internet's first investigative news
> magazine, known as Consortiumnews.com. The Web site became a way for me to
> put out well-reported stories that my former mainstream colleagues ignored
> or mocked.
> So, when Gary Webb called me in 1996 to talk about the Contra-cocaine
> story,
> I explained some of this tortured history and urged him to make sure that
> his editors were firmly behind him. He sounded perplexed at my advice and
> assured me that he had the solid support of his editors.
> When Webb's "Dark Alliance" series finally appeared in late August 1996, it
> initially drew little attention. The major national news outlets applied
> their usual studied indifference to a topic that they had already judged
> unworthy of serious attention.
> But Webb's story proved hard to ignore. First, unlike the work that Barger
> and I did for AP in the mid-1980s, Webb's series wasn't just a story about
> drug traffickers in Central America and their protectors in Washington. It
> was about the on-the-ground consequences, inside the United States, of that
> drug trafficking, how the lives of Americans were blighted and destroyed as
> the collateral damage of a U.S. foreign policy initiative.
> In other words, there were real-life American victims, and they were
> concentrated in African-American communities. That meant the ever-sensitive
> issue of race had been injected into the controversy. Anger from black
> communities spread quickly to the Congressional Black Caucus, which started
> demanding answers.
> Secondly, the San Jose Mercury-News, which was the local newspaper for
> Silicon Valley, had posted documents and audio on its state-of-the-art
> Internet site. That way, readers could examine much of the documentary
> support for the series.
> It also meant that the traditional "gatekeeper" role of the major
> newspapers
> -- the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times -- was
> under assault. If a regional paper like the Mercury-News could finance a
> major journalistic investigation like this one, and circumvent the
> judgments
> of the editorial boards at the Big Three, then there might be a tectonic
> shift in the power relations of the U.S. news media. There could be a
> breakdown of the established order.
> This combination of factors led to the next phase of the Contra-cocaine
> battle: the "get-Gary-Webb" counterattack. Soon, the Washington Post, the
> New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times were lining up like some tag-team
> wrestlers taking turns pummeling Webb and his story.
> On Oct. 4, 1996, the Washington Post published a front-page article
> knocking
> down Webb's series, although acknowledging that some Contra operatives did
> help the cocaine cartels. The Post's approach fit with the Big Media's
> cognitive dissonance on the topic: first, the Post called the
> Contra-cocaine
> allegations old news -- "even CIA personnel testified to Congress they knew
> that those covert operations involved drug traffickers," the Post said --
> and
> second, the Post minimized the importance of the one Contra smuggling
> channel that Webb had highlighted in his series, saying it had not "played
> a
> major role in the emergence of crack."
> To add to the smug hoo-hah treatment that was enveloping Webb and his
> story,
> the Post published a sidebar story dismissing African-Americans as prone to
> "conspiracy fears."
> Next, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times weighed in with lengthy
> articles castigating Webb and "Dark Alliance." The big newspapers made much
> of the CIA's internal reviews in 1987 and 1988 -- almost a decade earlier --
> that supposedly had cleared the spy agency of any role in Contra-cocaine
> smuggling.
> But the first ominous sign for the CIA's cover-up emerged on Oct. 24, 1996,
> when CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz conceded before the Senate
> Intelligence Committee that the first CIA probe had lasted only12 days, and
> the second only three days. He promised a more thorough review.
> Mocking Webb
> But Webb had already crossed over from being treated as a serious
> journalist
> to becoming a target of ridicule. Influential Washington Post media critic
> Howard Kurtz mocked Webb for saying in a book proposal that he would
> explore
> the possibility that the Contra war was primarily a business to its
> participants. "Oliver Stone, check your voice mail," Kurtz smirked.
> Yet, Webb's suspicion was no conspiracy theory. Indeed, Oliver North's
> chief
> Contra emissary, Rob Owen, had made the same point in a March 17, 1986
> message about the Contra leadership. "Few of the so-called leaders of the
> movement . . . really care about the boys in the field," Owen wrote. "THIS
> WAR HAS BECOME A BUSINESS TO MANY OF THEM." [Emphasis in original.]
> Ainsworth and other pro-Contra activists were reaching the same conclusion,
> that the Contra leadership was skimming money from the supply lines and
> padding their personal wealth with proceeds from the drug trade. According
> to a Jan. 21, 1987 interview report by the FBI, Ainsworth said he had "made
> inquiries in the local San Francisco Nicaraguan community and wondered
> among
> his acquaintances what Adolfo Calero and the other people in the FDN
> movement were doing and the word that he received back is that they were
> probably engaged in cocaine smuggling."
> In other words, Webb was right about the suspicion that the Contra movement
> had become less a cause than a business to many of its participants. Even
> Oliver North's emissary reported on that reality. But truthfulness had
> ceased to be relevant in the media's hazing of Gary Webb.
> In another double standard, while Webb was held to the strictest standards
> of journalism, it was entirely all right for Kurtz -- the supposed arbiter
> of
> journalistic integrity who was a longtime fixture on CNN's "Reliable
> Sources" -- to make judgments based on ignorance. Kurtz would face no
> repercussions for mocking a fellow journalist who was factually correct.
> The Big Three's assault -- combined with their disparaging tone -- had a
> predictable effect on the executives of the Mercury-News. As it turned out,
> Webb's confidence in his editors had been misplaced. By early 1997,
> executive editor Jerry Ceppos, who had his own corporate career to worry
> about, was in retreat.
> On May 11, 1997, Ceppos published a front-page column saying the series
> "fell short of my standards." He criticized the stories because they
> "strongly implied CIA knowledge" of Contra connections to U.S. drug dealers
> who were manufacturing crack cocaine. "We did not have enough proof that
> top
> CIA officials knew of the relationship," Ceppos wrote.
> Ceppos was wrong about the proof, of course. At AP, before we published our
> first Contra-cocaine article in 1985, Barger and I had known that the CIA
> and Reagan's White House were aware of the Contra-cocaine problem at senior
> levels. One of our sources was on Reagan's National Security Council staff.
> However, Ceppos recognized that he and his newspaper were facing a
> credibility crisis brought on by the harsh consensus delivered by the Big
> Three, a judgment that had quickly solidified into conventional wisdom
> throughout the major news media and inside Knight-Ridder, Inc., which owned
> the Mercury-News. The only career-saving move - career-saving for Ceppos
> even if career-destroying for Webb - was to jettison Webb and the
> Contra-cocaine investigative project.
> A 'Vindication'
> The big newspapers and the Contras' defenders celebrated Ceppos's retreat
> as
> vindication of their own dismissal of the Contra-cocaine stories. In
> particular, Kurtz seemed proud that his demeaning of Webb now had the
> endorsement of Webb's editor. Ceppos next pulled the plug on the
> Mercury-News' continuing Contra-cocaine investigation and reassigned Webb
> to
> a small office in Cupertino, California, far from his family. Webb resigned
> from the paper in disgrace. [See Consortiumnews.com's "Hung Out to Dry."]
> For undercutting Webb and other Mercury News reporters working on the
> Contra-cocaine project - some of whom were facing personal danger in
> Central
> America - Ceppos was lauded by the American Journalism Review and received
> the 1997 national Ethics in Journalism Award by the Society of Professional
> Journalists.
> While Ceppos won raves, Webb watched his career collapse and his marriage
> break up. Still, Gary Webb had set in motion internal government
> investigations that would bring to the surface long-hidden facts about how
> the Reagan administration had conducted the Contra war.
> The CIA published the first part of Inspector General Hitz's findings on
> Jan. 29, 1998. Though the CIA's press release for the report criticized
> Webb
> and defended the CIA, Hitz's Volume One admitted that not only were many of
> Webb's allegations true but that he actually understated the seriousness of
> the Contra-drug crimes and the CIA's knowledge of them.
> Hitz conceded that cocaine smugglers played a significant early role in the
> Contra movement and that the CIA intervened to block an image-threatening
> 1984 federal investigation into a San Francisco-based drug ring with
> suspected ties to the Contras, the so-called "Frogman Case."
> After Volume One was released, I called Webb (whom I had spent some time
> with since his series was published). I chided him for indeed getting the
> story "wrong." He had understated how serious the problem of Contra-cocaine
> trafficking had been, I said.
> It was a form of gallows humor for the two of us, since nothing had changed
> in the way the major newspapers treated the Contra-cocaine issue. They
> focused only on the press release that continued to attack Webb, while
> ignoring the incriminating information that could be found in the full
> report. All I could do was highlight those admissions at
> Consortiumnews.com,
> which sadly had a much, much smaller readership than the Big Three.
> The major U.S. news media also looked the other way on other startling
> disclosures.
> On May 7, 1998, for instance, Rep. Maxine Waters, a California Democrat,
> introduced into the Congressional Record a Feb. 11, 1982 letter of
> understanding between the CIA and the Justice Department. The letter, which
> had been requested by CIA Director William Casey, freed the CIA from legal
> requirements that it must report drug smuggling by CIA assets, a provision
> that covered the Nicaraguan Contras and the Afghan mujahedeen.
> In other words, early in those two covert wars, the CIA leadership wanted
> to
> make sure that its geopolitical objectives would not be complicated by a
> legal requirement to turn in its client forces for drug trafficking.
> Justice Denied
> The next break in the long-running Contra-cocaine cover-up was a report by
> the Justice Department's Inspector General Michael Bromwich. Given the
> hostile climate surrounding Webb's series, Bromwich's report also opened
> with criticism of Webb. But, like the CIA's Volume One, the contents
> revealed new details about serious government wrongdoing.
> According to evidence cited by Bromwich, the Reagan administration knew
> almost from the outset of the Contra war that cocaine traffickers permeated
> the paramilitary operation. The administration also did next to nothing to
> expose or stop the crimes. Bromwich's report revealed example after example
> of leads not followed, corroborated witnesses disparaged, official
> law-enforcement investigations sabotaged, and even the CIA facilitating the
> work of drug traffickers.
> The report showed that the Contras and their supporters ran several
> parallel
> drug-smuggling operations, not just the one at the center of Webb's series.
> The report also found that the CIA shared little of its information about
> Contra drugs with law-enforcement agencies and on three occasions disrupted
> cocaine-trafficking investigations that threatened the Contras.
> As well as depicting a more widespread Contra-drug operation than Webb (or
> Barger and I) had understood, the Justice Department report provided some
> important corroboration about Nicaraguan drug smuggler Norwin Meneses, a
> key
> figure in Gary Webb's series and Adolfo Calero's friend as described by
> Dennis Ainsworth.
> Bromwich cited U.S. government informants who supplied detailed information
> about Meneses's drug operation and his financial assistance to the Contras.
> For instance, Renato Pena, the money-and-drug courier for Meneses, said
> that
> in the early 1980s the CIA allowed the Contras to fly drugs into the United
> States, sell them, and keep the proceeds. Pena, the FDN's northern
> California representative, said the drug trafficking was forced on the
> Contras by the inadequate levels of U.S. government assistance.
> The Justice Department report also disclosed repeated examples of the CIA
> and U.S. embassies in Central America discouraging DEA investigations,
> including one into Contra-cocaine shipments moving through the
> international
> airport in El Salvador. Bromwich said secrecy trumped all. "We have no
> doubt
> that the CIA and the U.S. Embassy were not anxious for the DEA to pursue
> its
> investigation at the airport," he wrote.
> Bromwich also described the curious case of how a DEA pilot helped a CIA
> asset escape from Costa Rican authorities in 1989 after the man, American
> farmer John Hull, had been charged in connection with Contra-cocaine
> trafficking. [See Consortiumnews.com's "John Hull's Great Escape."]
> Hull's ranch in northern Costa Rica had been the site of Contra camps for
> attacking Nicaragua from the south. For years, Contra-connected witnesses
> also said Hull's property was used for the transshipment of cocaine en
> route
> to the United States, but those accounts were brushed aside by the Reagan
> administration and disparaged in major U.S. newspapers.
> Yet, according to Bromwich's report, the DEA took the accounts seriously
> enough to prepare a research report on the evidence in November 1986. One
> informant described Colombian cocaine off-loaded at an airstrip on Hull's
> ranch.
> The drugs were then concealed in a shipment of frozen shrimp and
> transported
> to the United States. The alleged Costa Rican shipper was Frigorificos de
> Puntarenas, a firm controlled by Cuban-American Luis Rodriguez. Like Hull,
> however, Frigorificos had friends in high places. In 1985-86, the State
> Department had selected the shrimp company to handle $261,937 in non-lethal
> assistance earmarked for the Contras.
> Hull also remained a man with powerful protectors. Even after Costa Rican
> authorities brought drug charges against him, influential Americans,
> including Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Indiana, demanded that Hull be let out of
> jail pending trial. Then, in July 1989 with the help of a DEA pilot - and
> possibly a DEA agent - Hull managed to fly out of Costa Rica to Haiti and
> then to the United States.
> Despite these startling new disclosures, the big newspapers still showed no
> inclination to read beyond the criticism of Webb in the press release.
> Major Disclosures
> By fall 1998, Washington was obsessed with President Bill Clinton's Monica
> Lewinsky sex scandal, which made it easier to ignore even more stunning
> Contra-cocaine disclosures in the CIA's Volume Two, published on Oct. 8,
> 1998.
> In the report, CIA Inspector General Hitz identified more than 50 Contras
> and Contra-related entities implicated in the drug trade. He also detailed
> how the Reagan administration had protected these drug operations and
> frustrated federal investigations throughout the 1980s.
> According to Volume Two, the CIA knew the criminal nature of its Contra
> clients from the start of the war against Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista
> government. The earliest Contra force, called the Nicaraguan Revolutionary
> Democratic Alliance (ADREN) or the 15th of September Legion, had chosen "to
> stoop to criminal activities in order to feed and clothe their cadre,"
> according to a June 1981 draft of a CIA field report.
> According to a September 1981 cable to CIA headquarters, two ADREN members
> made the first delivery of drugs to Miami in July 1981. ADREN's leaders
> included Enrique Bermúdez and other early Contras who would later direct
> the
> major Contra army, the CIA-organized FDN which was based in Honduras, along
> Nicaragua's northern border.
> Throughout the war, Bermúdez remained the top Contra military commander.
> The
> CIA later corroborated the allegations about ADREN's cocaine trafficking,
> but insisted that Bermúdez had opposed the drug shipments to the United
> States that went ahead nonetheless.
> The truth about Bermúdez's supposed objections to drug trafficking,
> however,
> was less clear. According to Hitz's Volume One, Bermúdez enlisted Norwin
> Meneses - the Nicaraguan cocaine smuggler, the friend of Adolfo Calero, and
> a key figure in Webb's series - to raise money and buy supplies for the
> Contras.
> Volume One had quoted another Nicaraguan trafficker, Danilo Blandón, a
> Meneses associate (and another lead character in Webb's series), as telling
> Hitz's investigators that he (Blandón) and Meneses flew to Honduras to meet
> with Bermúdez in 1982. At the time, Meneses's criminal activities were
> well-known in the Nicaraguan exile community, but Bermúdez told the cocaine
> smugglers that "the ends justify the means" in raising money for the
> Contras.
> After the Bermúdez meeting, Meneses and Blandón were briefly arrested by
> Honduran police who confiscated $100,000 that the police suspected was to
> be
> a payment for a drug transaction. The Contras intervened, gained freedom
> for
> the two traffickers and got them their money back by saying the cash, which
> indeed was for a cocaine purchase in Bolivia, belonged to the Contras.
> There were other indications of Bermúdez's drug-smuggling complicity. In
> February 1988, another Nicaraguan exile linked to the drug trade accused
> Bermúdez of participation in narcotics trafficking, according to Hitz's
> report. After the Contra war ended, Bermúdez returned to Managua,
> Nicaragua,
> where he was shot to death on Feb. 16, 1991. The murder has never been
> solved.
> The Southern Front
> Along the Southern Front, the Contras' military operations in Costa Rica on
> Nicaragua's southern border, the CIA's drug evidence centered on the forces
> of Edén Pastora, another top Contra commander. But Hitz discovered that the
> U.S. government may have made the drug situation worse, not better.
> Hitz revealed that the CIA put an admitted drug operative -- known by his
> CIA
> pseudonym "Ivan Gomez" -- in a supervisory position over Pastora. Hitz
> reported that the CIA discovered Gomez's drug history in 1987 when Gomez
> failed a security review on drug-trafficking questions.
> In internal CIA interviews, Gomez admitted that in March or April 1982, he
> helped family members who were engaged in drug trafficking and money
> laundering. In one case, Gomez said he assisted his brother and
> brother-in-law transporting cash from New York City to Miami. He admitted
> he
> "knew this act was illegal."
> Later, Gomez expanded on his admission, describing how his family members
> had fallen $2 million into debt and had gone to Miami to run a
> money-laundering center for drug traffickers. Gomez said "his brother had
> many visitors whom [Gomez] assumed to be in the drug trafficking business."
> Gomez's brother was arrested on drug charges in June 1982. Three months
> later, in September 1982, Gomez started his CIA assignment in Costa Rica.
> Years later, convicted drug trafficker Carlos Cabezas alleged that in the
> early 1980s, Ivan Gomez was the CIA agent in Costa Rica who was overseeing
> drug-money donations to the Contras. Gomez "was to make sure the money was
> given to the right people [the Contras] and nobody was taking . . . profit
> they weren't supposed to," Cabezas stated publicly.
> But the CIA sought to discredit Cabezas at the time because he had trouble
> identifying Gomez's picture and put Gomez at one meeting in early 1982
> before Gomez started his CIA assignment. While the CIA was able to fend off
> Cabezas's allegations by pointing to these minor discrepancies, Hitz's
> report revealed that the CIA was nevertheless aware of Gomez's direct role
> in drug-money laundering, a fact the agency hid from Sen. Kerry in his
> investigation during the late 1980s.
> There was also more to know about Gomez. In November 1985, the FBI learned
> from an informant that Gomez's two brothers had been large-scale cocaine
> importers, with one brother arranging shipments from Bolivia's infamous
> drug
> kingpin Roberto Suarez.
> Suarez already was known as a financier of right-wing causes. In 1980, with
> the support of Argentina's hard-line anticommunist military regime, Suarez
> bankrolled a coup in Bolivia that ousted the elected left-of-center
> government. The violent putsch became known as the Cocaine Coup because it
> made Bolivia the region's first narco-state.
> By protecting cocaine shipments headed north, Bolivia's government helped
> transform Colombia's Medellín cartel from a struggling local operation into
> a giant corporate-style business for delivering vast quantities of cocaine
> to the U.S. market.
> Flush with cash in the early 1980s, Suarez invested more than $30 million
> in
> various right-wing paramilitary operations, including the Contra forces in
> Central America, according to U.S. Senate testimony by an Argentine
> intelligence officer, Leonardo Sanchez-Reisse.
> In 1987, Sanchez-Reisse said the Suarez drug money was laundered through
> front companies in Miami before going to Central America. There, other
> Argentine intelligence officers -- veterans of the Bolivian coup -- trained
> the Contras in the early 1980s, even before the CIA arrived to first assist
> with the training and later take over the Contra operation from the
> Argentines.
> Inspector General Hitz added another piece to the mystery of the
> Bolivian-Contra connection. One Contra fund-raiser, Jose Orlando Bolanos,
> boasted that the Argentine government was supporting his Contra activities,
> according to a May 1982 cable to CIA headquarters. Bolanos made the
> statement during a meeting with undercover DEA agents in Florida. He even
> offered to introduce them to his Bolivian cocaine supplier.
> Despite all this suspicious drug activity centered around Ivan Gomez and
> the
> Contras, the CIA insisted that it did not unmask Gomez until 1987, when he
> failed a security check and confessed his role in his family's drug
> business. The CIA official who interviewed Gomez concluded that "Gomez
> directly participated in illegal drug transactions, concealed participation
> in illegal drug transactions, and concealed information about involvement
> in
> illegal drug activity," Hitz wrote.
> But senior CIA officials still protected Gomez. They refused to refer the
> Gomez case to the Justice Department, citing the 1982 agreement that spared
> the CIA from a legal obligation to report narcotics crimes by people
> collaborating with the CIA who were not formal agency employees. Gomez was
> an independent contractor who worked for the CIA but was not officially on
> staff. The CIA eased Gomez out of the agency in February 1988, without
> alerting law enforcement or the congressional oversight committees.
> When questioned about the case nearly a decade later, one senior CIA
> official who had supported the gentle treatment of Gomez had second
> thoughts. "It is a striking commentary on me and everyone that this guy's
> involvement in narcotics didn't weigh more heavily on me or the system,"
> the
> official told Hitz's investigators.
> Drug Path to the White House
> A Medellín drug connection arose in another section of Hitz's report, when
> he revealed evidence suggesting that some Contra trafficking may have been
> sanctioned by Reagan's National Security Council. The protagonist for this
> part of the Contra-cocaine mystery was Moises Nunez, a Cuban-American who
> worked for Oliver North's NSC Contra-support operation and for two
> drug-connected seafood importers, Ocean Hunter in Miami and Frigorificos De
> Puntarenas in Costa Rica.
> Frigorificos De Puntarenas was created in the early 1980s as a cover for
> drug-money laundering, according to sworn testimony by two of the firm's
> principals -- Carlos Soto and Medellín cartel accountant Ramon Milian
> Rodriguez. (It was also the company implicated by a DEA informant in moving
> cocaine from John Hull's ranch to the United States.)
> Drug allegations were swirling around Moises Nunez by the mid-1980s.
> Indeed,
> his operation was one of the targets of my and Barger's AP investigation in
> 1985. Finally reacting to the suspicions, the CIA questioned Nunez about
> his
> alleged cocaine trafficking on March 25, 1987. He responded by pointing the
> finger at his NSC superiors.
> "Nunez revealed that since 1985, he had engaged in a clandestine
> relationship with the National Security Council," Hitz reported, adding:
> "Nunez refused to elaborate on the nature of these actions, but indicated
> it
> was difficult to answer questions relating to his involvement in narcotics
> trafficking because of the specific tasks he had performed at the direction
> of the NSC. Nunez refused to identify the NSC officials with whom he had
> been involved."
> After this first round of questioning, CIA headquarters authorized an
> additional session, but then senior CIA officials reversed the decision.
> There would be no further efforts at "debriefing Nunez."
> Hitz noted that "the cable [from headquarters] offered no explanation for
> the decision" to stop the Nunez interrogation. But the CIA's Central
> American Task Force chief Alan Fiers Jr. said the Nunez-NSC drug lead was
> not pursued "because of the NSC connection and the possibility that this
> could be somehow connected to the Private Benefactor program [the Contra
> money handled by the NSC's Oliver North] a decision was made not to pursue
> this matter."
> Joseph Fernandez, who had been the CIA's station chief in Costa Rica,
> confirmed to congressional Iran-Contra investigators that Nunez "was
> involved in a very sensitive operation" for North's "Enterprise." The exact
> nature of that NSC-authorized activity has never been divulged.
> At the time of the Nunez-NSC drug admissions and his truncated
> interrogation, the CIA's acting director was Robert Gates, who nearly two
> decades later became President George W. Bush's second secretary of
> defense,
> a position he retained under President Barack Obama.
> Drug Record
> The CIA also worked directly with other drug-connected Cuban-Americans on
> the Contra project, Hitz found. One of Nunez's Cuban-American associates,
> Felipe Vidal, had a criminal record as a narcotics trafficker in the 1970s.
> But the CIA still hired him to serve as a logistics coordinator for the
> Contras, Hitz reported.
> The CIA also learned that Vidal's drug connections were not only in the
> past. A December 1984 cable to CIA headquarters revealed Vidal's ties to
> Rene Corvo, another Cuban-American suspected of drug trafficking. Corvo was
> working with Cuban anticommunist Frank Castro, who was viewed as a Medellín
> cartel representative within the Contra movement.
> There were other narcotics links to Vidal. In January 1986, the DEA in
> Miami
> seized 414 pounds of cocaine concealed in a shipment of yucca that was
> going
> from a Contra operative in Costa Rica to Ocean Hunter, the company where
> Vidal (and Moises Nunez) worked. Despite the evidence, Vidal remained a CIA
> employee as he collaborated with Frank Castro's assistant, Rene Corvo, in
> raising money for the Contras, according to a CIA memo in June 1986.
> By fall 1986, Sen. Kerry had heard enough rumors about Vidal to demand
> information about him as part of his congressional inquiry into Contra
> drugs. But the CIA withheld the derogatory information in its files. On
> Oct.
> 15, 1986, Kerry received a briefing from the CIA's Alan Fiers, who didn't
> mention Vidal's drug arrests and conviction in the 1970s.
> But Vidal was not yet in the clear. In 1987, the U.S. Attorney's Office in
> Miami began investigating Vidal, Ocean Hunter, and other Contra-connected
> entities. This prosecutorial attention worried the CIA. The CIA's Latin
> American division felt it was time for a security review of Vidal. But on
> Aug. 5, 1987, the CIA's security office blocked the review for fear that
> the
> Vidal drug information "could be exposed during any future litigation."
> As expected, the U.S. Attorney's Office did request documents about
> "Contra-related activities" by Vidal, Ocean Hunter, and 16 other entities.
> The CIA advised the prosecutor that "no information had been found
> regarding
> Ocean Hunter," a statement that was clearly false. The CIA continued
> Vidal's
> employment as an adviser to the Contra movement until 1990, virtually the
> end of the Contra war.
> Hitz also revealed that drugs tainted the highest levels of the
> Honduran-based FDN, the largest Contra army. Hitz found that Juan Rivas, a
> Contra commander who rose to be chief of staff, admitted that he had been a
> cocaine trafficker in Colombia before the war.
> The CIA asked Rivas, known as El Quiche, about his background after the DEA
> began suspecting that Rivas might be an escaped convict from a Colombian
> prison. In interviews with CIA officers, Rivas acknowledged that he had
> been
> arrested and convicted of packaging and transporting cocaine for the drug
> trade in Barranquilla, Colombia. After several months in prison, Rivas
> said,
> he escaped and moved to Central America, where he joined the Contras.
> Defending Rivas, CIA officials insisted that there was no evidence that
> Rivas engaged in trafficking while with the Contras. But one CIA cable
> noted
> that he lived an expensive lifestyle, even keeping a $100,000 Thoroughbred
> horse at the Contra camp. Contra military commander Bermúdez later
> attributed Rivas's wealth to his ex-girlfriend's rich family. But a CIA
> cable in March 1989 added that "some in the FDN may have suspected at the
> time that the father-in-law was engaged in drug trafficking."
> Still, the CIA moved quickly to protect Rivas from exposure and possible
> extradition to Colombia. In February 1989, CIA headquarters asked that the
> DEA take no action "in view of the serious political damage to the U.S.
> Government that could occur should the information about Rivas become
> public." Rivas was eased out of the Contra leadership with an explanation
> of
> poor health. With U.S. government help, he was allowed to resettle in
> Miami.
> Colombia was not informed about his fugitive status.
> Another senior FDN official implicated in the drug trade was its chief
> spokesman in Honduras, Arnoldo Jose "Frank" Arana. The drug allegations
> against Arana dated back to 1983 when a federal narcotics task force put
> him
> under criminal investigation because of plans "to smuggle 100 kilograms of
> cocaine into the United States from South America." On Jan. 23, 1986, the
> FBI reported that Arana and his brothers were involved in a drug-smuggling
> enterprise, although Arana was not charged.
> Arana sought to clear up another set of drug suspicions in 1989 by visiting
> the DEA in Honduras with a business associate, Jose Perez. Arana's
> association with Perez, however, only raised new alarms. If "Arana is mixed
> up with the Perez brothers, he is probably dirty," the DEA said.
> Drug Airlines
> Through their ownership of an air services company called SETCO, the Perez
> brothers were associated with Juan Matta-Ballesteros, a major cocaine
> kingpin connected to the 1985 torture-murder of DEA agent Enrique "Kiki"
> Camarena, according to reports by the DEA and U.S. Customs. Hitz reported
> that someone at the CIA scribbled a note on a DEA cable about Arana
> stating:
> "Arnold Arana . . . still active and working, we [CIA] may have a problem."
> Despite its drug ties to Matta-Ballesteros, SETCO emerged as the principal
> company for ferrying supplies to the Contras in Honduras. During
> congressional Iran-Contra hearings, FDN political leader Adolfo Calero
> testified that SETCO was paid from bank accounts controlled by Oliver
> North.
> SETCO also received $185,924 from the State Department for delivering
> supplies to the Contras in 1986. Furthermore, Hitz found that other air
> transport companies used by the Contras were implicated in the cocaine
> trade
> as well.
> Even FDN leaders suspected that they were shipping supplies to Central
> America aboard planes that might be returning with drugs. Mario Calero,
> Adolfo Calero's brother and the chief of Contra logistics, grew so uneasy
> about one air freight company that he notified U.S. law enforcement that
> the
> FDN only chartered the planes for the flights south, not the return flights
> north.
> Hitz found that some drug pilots simply rotated from one sector of the
> Contra operation to another. Donaldo Frixone, who had a drug record in the
> Dominican Republic, was hired by the CIA to fly Contra missions from 1983
> to
> 1985. In September 1986, however, Frixone was implicated in smuggling
> 19,000
> pounds of marijuana into the United States. In late 1986 or early 1987, he
> went to work for Vortex, another U.S.-paid Contra supply company linked to
> the drug trade.
> By the time that Hitz's Volume Two was published in fall 1998, the CIA's
> defense against Webb's series had shrunk to a fig leaf: that the CIA did
> not
> conspire with the Contras to raise money through cocaine trafficking. But
> Hitz made clear that the Contra war took precedence over law enforcement
> and
> that the CIA withheld evidence of Contra crimes from the Justice
> Department,
> Congress, and even the CIA's own analytical division.
> Besides tracing the evidence of Contra-drug trafficking through the
> decade-long Contra war, the inspector general interviewed senior CIA
> officers who acknowledged that they were aware of the Contra-drug problem
> but didn't want its exposure to undermine the struggle to overthrow
> Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government.
> According to Hitz, the CIA had "one overriding priority: to oust the
> Sandinista government. . . . [CIA officers] were determined that the
> various
> difficulties they encountered not be allowed to prevent effective
> implementation of the Contra program." One CIA field officer explained,
> "The
> focus was to get the job done, get the support and win the war."
> Hitz also recounted complaints from CIA analysts that CIA operations
> officers handling the Contras hid evidence of Contra-drug trafficking even
> from the CIA's analysts.
> Because of the withheld evidence, the CIA analysts incorrectly concluded in
> the mid-1980s that "only a handful of Contras might have been involved in
> drug trafficking." That false assessment was passed on to Congress and to
> major news organizations -- serving as an important basis for denouncing
> Gary
> Webb and his "Dark Alliance" series in 1996.
> CIA Admission
> Although Hitz's report was an extraordinary admission of institutional
> guilt
> by the CIA, it went almost unnoticed by the big American newspapers.
> On Oct. 10, 1998, two days after Hitz's Volume Two was posted on the CIA's
> Web site, the New York Times published a brief article that continued to
> deride Webb but acknowledged the Contra-drug problem may have been worse
> than earlier understood. Several weeks later, the Washington Post weighed
> in
> with a story that simply missed the point of the CIA's confession. Though
> having assigned 17 journalists to tear down Webb's reporting, the Los
> Angeles Times chose not to publish a story on the release of Hitz's Volume
> Two.
> In 2000, the House Intelligence Committee grudgingly acknowledged that the
> stories about Reagan's CIA protecting Contra drug traffickers were true.
> The
> committee released a report citing classified testimony from CIA Inspector
> General Britt Snider (Hitz's successor) admitting that the spy agency had
> turned a blind eye to evidence of Contra-drug smuggling and generally
> treated drug smuggling through Central America as a low priority.
> "In the end the objective of unseating the Sandinistas appears to have
> taken
> precedence over dealing properly with potentially serious allegations
> against those with whom the agency was working," Snider said, adding that
> the CIA did not treat the drug allegations in "a consistent, reasoned or
> justifiable manner."
> The House committee -- then controlled by Republicans -- still downplayed the
> significance of the Contra-cocaine scandal, but the panel acknowledged,
> deep
> inside its report, that in some cases, "CIA employees did nothing to verify
> or disprove drug trafficking information, even when they had the
> opportunity
> to do so. In some of these, receipt of a drug allegation appeared to
> provoke
> no specific response, and business went on as usual."
> Like the release of Hitz's report in 1998, the admissions by Snider and the
> House committee drew virtually no media attention in 2000 -- except for a
> few
> articles on the Internet, including one at Consortiumnews.com.
> Because of this journalistic misconduct by the Big Three newspapers --
> choosing to conceal their own neglect of the Contra-cocaine scandal and to
> protect the Reagan administration's image -- Webb's reputation was never
> rehabilitated.
> After his original "Dark Alliance" series was published in 1996, I joined
> Webb in a few speaking appearances on the West Coast, including one packed
> book talk at the Midnight Special bookstore in Santa Monica, California.
> For
> a time, Webb was treated as a celebrity on the American Left, but that
> gradually faded.
> In our interactions during these joint appearances, I found Webb to be a
> regular guy who seemed to be holding up fairly well under the terrible
> pressure. He had landed an investigative job with a California state
> legislative committee. He also felt some measure of vindication when CIA
> Inspector General Hitz's reports came out.
> But Webb never could overcome the pain caused by his betrayal at the hands
> of his journalistic colleagues, his peers. In the years that followed, Webb
> was unable to find decent-paying work in his profession -- the conventional
> wisdom remained that he had somehow been exposed as a journalistic fraud.
> His state job ended; his marriage fell apart; he struggled to pay bills;
> and
> he was faced with a forced move out of a house near Sacramento, California,
> and in with his mother.
> On Dec. 9, 2004, the 49-year-old Webb typed out suicide notes to his
> ex-wife
> and his three children; laid out a certificate for his cremation; and taped
> a note on the door telling movers -- who were coming the next morning -- to
> instead call 911. Webb then took out his father's pistol and shot himself
> in
> the head. The first shot was not lethal, so he fired once more.
> Even with Webb's death, the big newspapers that had played key roles in his
> destruction couldn't bring themselves to show Webb any mercy. After Webb's
> body was found, I received a call from a reporter for the Los Angeles Times
> who knew that I was one of Webb's few journalistic colleagues who had
> defended him and his work.
> I told the reporter that American history owed a great debt to Gary Webb
> because he had forced out important facts about Reagan-era crimes. But I
> added that the Los Angeles Times would be hard-pressed to write an honest
> obituary because the newspaper had ignored Hitz's final report, which had
> largely vindicated Webb.
> To my disappointment but not my surprise, I was correct. The Los Angeles
> Times ran a mean-spirited obituary that made no mention of either my
> defense
> of Webb, nor the CIA's admissions in 1998. The obituary was republished in
> other newspapers, including the Washington Post.
> In effect, Webb's suicide enabled senior editors at the Big Three
> newspapers
> to breathe a little easier -- one of the few people who understood the ugly
> story of the Reagan administration's cover-up of the Contra-cocaine scandal
> and the U.S. media's complicity was now silenced.
> To this day, none of the journalists or media critics who participated in
> the destruction of Gary Webb has paid a price. None has faced the sort of
> humiliation that Webb had to endure. None had to experience that special
> pain of standing up for what is best in the profession of journalism --
> taking on a difficult story that seeks to hold powerful people accountable
> for serious crimes -- and then being vilified by your own colleagues, the
> people that you expected to understand and appreciate what you had done.
> On the contrary, many were rewarded with professional advancement and
> lucrative careers. For instance, for years, Howard Kurtz got to host the
> CNN
> program, "Reliable Sources," which lectured journalists on professional
> standards. He was described in the program's bio as "the nation's premier
> media critic." (His show has since moved to Fox News, renamed "MediaBuzz.")
> The rehabilitation of Webb's reputation and the correction of this dark
> chapter of American history now rest on how the public responds to the
> presentation of Webb's story in the film, "Kill the Messenger." It's also
> unclear how the Big Media will react. Last Sunday, New York Times' media
> writer David Carr continued some of the old quibbling about Webb's series
> but did acknowledge the Contra-cocaine reality.
> Carr's movie review began with a straightforward recognition of the
> long-denied truth: "If someone told you today that there was strong
> evidence
> that the Central Intelligence Agency once turned a blind eye to accusations
> of drug dealing by operatives it worked with, it might ring some distant,
> skeptical bell. Did that really happen? That really happened."
> Yes, that really happened.
>
>
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